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OSGOODE HALL REVIEW OF LAW 
AND POLICY 
 





CHOCOLATE, COPYRIGHT, CONFUSION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 





This lecture scans how the Supreme Court has been interpreting Canada’s 
intellectual property laws and how its decisions may affect legislative policy. 
The Court has become more interested and competent in this field than was 
the case even a couple of decades ago.  The approach in two decisions of the 
Court, Compo Co. Ltd v. Blue Crest Music Inc. (1979) and Euro-Excellence 
Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc. (2007) is particularly compared. Compo contains 
propositions which unintendedly cast a baneful influence over later law, 
while Kraft sees the Court split four ways in a case where copyright law was 
used unsuccessfully to attempt to block parallel imports of chocolate bars 
into Canada.  The lecture concludes that such decisions, among others, 
expose how inadequately successive governments have monitored 
intellectual property law developments.  It calls for an independent 
commission to develop a more coherent intellectual property code that will 
advance Canadian economic interests and be readily understood by its users. 
 
                                                           
*  Professor Emeritus of Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, 
University of Oxford.  This paper is a revised version of the James L. Lewtas Lecture 
delivered at Osgoode Hall Law School on October 24, 2007.  A webcast is archived at 
mms://media.osgoode.yorku.ca/events/LewtasLecture-Oct242007.wmv.  A version in 
French is in progress for publication. 
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The brief for this lecture was “to stimulate fresh thinking in 
Osgoode Hall Law School and the University, legal and general 
communities about legal and public policy related to business and 
economic activity.”  In the intellectual property field, there is so much 
thinking now around that one hesitates to warrant that what one 
proffers is “fresh”.  Ecclesiastes (1:9) is no help in laying down that 
“What has been will be again; what has been done will be done again; 
there is nothing new under the sun.”  
Fortunately, intellectual property lawyers treat that verse, 
despite its high authority, as obiter dicta.  Copyright law calls 
anything “fresh” that is not copied and that involves a bit of skill or 
judgment.  What’s more, it protects that compositional speck from 
being copied pretty well worldwide for the lifetime of the author and 
another fifty (and in some places—Europe, the United States, 
Australia—even seventy) years.  The level of freshness required is 
indicated by the Supreme Court’s decision three years ago that 
headnotes and catchlines to law reports are original.1  My talk is 
longer than a catchline, perhaps even longer than some Supreme 
Court headnotes.  I have a few old ideas to recycle but I promise to 
give them new clothes so they look fresh.  Copyright law is, after all, 
about looks, not substance.  In any event, construing my brief 
purposively—as is the current interpretative fashion—I believe I need 
only stimulate you to think freshly. 
Nobody will dispute that intellectual property law is, in terms 
of the brief, “related to business and economic activity”; indeed, it is 
central to much of it.2  True, there are people who tinker in the 
basement, and even in universities, just for the fun of it.  Many do so 
without knowing or caring about intellectual property law.  They 
mess about just because they are innately curious about their world, 
how it works, and how it might be made to work better.  Even that 
                                                           
1 CCH Canadian Ltd v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 
339, 236 D.L.R. (4th) 395 [CCH]. 
2 A recent statistical study on the Supreme Court lumps “intellectual property” and 
“patents” (an interesting subcategorization in itself) in with banking, competition law, 
and insurance under the heading of “Corporate” cases: A. Green & B. Alarie, “Policy 
Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (Paper 
presented at the 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, New York 
University School of Law 9 November 2007) at 13, online: Social Science Research 
Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1013560>.  
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probably constitutes economic activity, liberally construed.  Tinkering 
involves opportunity costs, but also creates welfare by keeping 
tinkerers from otherwise roaming streets with intent. 
There is a minority school of romantic thought which idolizes 
authors, artists and the copyright law that protects them as being 
outside and beyond commerce.  But that view has attracted little 
interest among North American materialists; nor would it be 
recognized by those whose daily job is to help authors, composers and 
artists make a decent living from their endeavours.  What 
governments think of intellectual property is conclusively established 
by the appearance of whole chapters devoted to intellectual property 
in free trade agreements such as NAFTA (1992) and the World Trade 
Organization Agreement (1994). Such treaties emphasize that 
intellectual property is not just business and economics: it is big 
business and global economics. 
 
I 
How is the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with intellectual 
property cases and what are the implications of its decisions for 
Canada’s intellectual property system?  Is there some shortfall and, if 
so, what can be done about it?  These are large questions, and I can 
only sketch a response in a lecture such as this.  I shall take mainly 
two decisions as examples – one from nearly thirty years ago, the 
other from mid-2007.  
By way of preface, I should note that there is actually no such 
single legal entity as Intellectual Property. The phrase is just 
convenient shorthand for a whole raft of different rights: some 
statutory, some judge-made.  Their common thread is that they 
protect some products of the human mind, for varying periods of 
time, against use by others of those products in various ways.3 
There is continuing philosophical debate about why society 
grants these rights at all: the shades of Locke, Kant, Adam Smith, 
Bentham, Hegel and Marx wander the terrain, together with their 
intellectual successors.  None provides a single sufficient explanation. 
For our purposes, intellectual property rights, as currently configured, 
                                                           
3 Intellectual property boosters may prefer a more ornate description of the field, but I 
leave fairy stories for nurseries. 
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are best justified as encouraging those who may wish to create, 
finance or exploit products of the mind to translate intent into act, 
particularly where they might otherwise not act at all, or act less often 
or less well, without the carrot of protection. 
The most familiar rights are patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks, but lots more have been added or developed over time: 
industrial design rights, semiconductor topography and plant breeder 
rights, common law and delictual rights over trade secrets and 
confidential information, and other rights that prevent or redress 
various acts of unfair competition (such as passing-off).  Patent law 
protects new and non-obvious inventions; copyright protects creative 
work from being copied; trade-mark law protects trade-marks from 
confusion and other objectionable practices.  The rights are largely 
territorial but are fairly standardized worldwide as a result of 
intellectual property treaties and free trade agreements. 
Twenty, even ten, years ago, a topic on the Supreme Court 
and intellectual property would have produced a pretty thin lecture.  
Till then in the post-World War II period, the Supreme Court of 
Canada continued doing mostly other things than intellectual 
property. It regarded intellectual property as arcana best left to the 
experts.  The cases that came to it involved mainly pharmaceutical 
patents, the now defunct compulsory patent licensing scheme, 
copyright in music, records or broadcasting, the odd case on industrial 
design, trade-mark passing-off or procedure, or even on constitutional 
law (e.g., Could the Parliament create a tort of unfair competition?  
Answer: no; unfair competition might be trade and commerce, but 
just enacting a tort was not “regulation” of it).4  The Court seemed 
most comfortable when handling the common law cases.  It 
generalized and discussed policy according to the fashion of the time 
and the judges’ individual inclinations, much as it did in other cases of 
tort.  As soon as the Court ventured into the statutory intellectual 
property rights, one immediately sensed its awkwardness, its wish to 
stay close to the statutory language, find a handy precedent from 
England or an earlier Canadian case, and, after reciting the facts and 
the lower courts’ disposition of the case, say just the bare minimum 
                                                           
4 MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 66 D.L.R. (3d) 1, Laskin C.J.C 
for the majority, concurring judgment by de Grandpré J [MacDonald]. 
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necessary to get by.5  What sparks there were came from the federal 
and provincial trial courts and courts of appeal.6 
There were of course exceptions.  Pigeon J. seemed actually to 
enjoy his forays into patent law,7 although his pronouncements on 
trade-marks and copyright could be somewhat delphic.8 Judson J. 
wrote some workmanlike opinions across the board,9 as did Martland 
                                                           
5 See e.g., Cuisenaire v. South West Imports Ltd, [1969] S.C.R. 208, 2 D.L.R. (3d) 430, 
Ritchie J. for the Court (no copyright in mathematics teaching rods); Webb & Knapp 
(Can.) Ltd, v. Edmonton (City), [1970] S.C.R. 588, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 544, Hall J. for 
majority, Abbott J. for the dissenters [Webb & Knapp] (awarding damages for 
copyright infringement of architectural plans). 
6 See e.g., Hay v. Sloan (1957), 12 D.L.R.(2d) 397 (Ont. H.C.), where a refreshing 
opinion by Stewart J, ranging from Vitruvius and Palladio through to Mondrian and 
Gertrude Stein, determined that a simple house qualified for copyright as an original 
“architectural work of art”.  The following sample typifies the whole:  
“Suppose a man were to build himself a pig-pen garnished with fretted gingerbread 
and with four lovely turrets, yet firm and commodious. Let it stand in its 
multicoloured horror a mid-Victorian blot upon the landscape. Let us assume that no 
contemporary could accept this edifice as anything but an architectural excrescence 
of the most loathsome kind, yet to its creator it could well be a thing of beauty and to 
its inhabitants a porcine paradise.  An attempt has been made to produce venustas and 
some originality displayed.  This, in my view, is sufficient to render such building the 
subject-matter of copyright.” 
7 See e.g., Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1974] S.C.R. 
111, 8 C.P.R. (2d) 202 (medical invention); Burton Parsons Chemicals Inc. v. Hewlett-
Packard (Can.) Ltd (1974), 17 C.P.R.(2d) 97 (reissue and claim construction); 
Monsanto Co. v. Commissioner of Patents [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1108, 100 D.L.R. (3d) 385, 
Pigeon J. for majority (allowable extent of claim and Commissioner’s duties); 
Farbwerke Hoechst AG v. Halocarbon (Ont.) Ltd [1979] 2 S.C.R. 929, 104 D.L.R.(3d) 
51, Pigeon J. for majority (novelty and non-obviousness). 
8 CAPAC v. CTV Television Network Ltd, [1968] S.C.R. 676, 68 D.L.R. (2d) 98 
(transmitting music over network was communicating not the “work” but merely a 
“performance” of it); Home Juice Co. v. Orange Maison Ltée, [1970] S.C.R. 942 , 16 
D.L.R. (3d) 740 (restricting, without statutory authority, trade-mark registration to 
single province); S.C. Johnson & Son Ltd. v. Marketing International Ltd., [1980] 1 
S.C.R. 99, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 423 (“Off!” trade-mark for insect repellent unregistrable as 
clearly descriptive because elliptical). 
9 Circle Film Enterprises Inc. v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1959] S.C.R. 602, 20 
D.L.R. (2d) 211 (effect of copyright registration) [Circle Film]; Commissioner of 
Patents v. Farbwerke Hoechst AG [1964] S.C.R. 49, 41 C.P.R. 9 (double patenting); 
Cheerio Toys & Games Ltd v. Dubiner, [1966] S.C.R. 206, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 313 
(dissenting from Hall J.’s majority view that assignors cannot challenge an assigned 
trade-mark’s validity); Netupsky v. Dominion Bridge Co. Ltd, [1972] S.C.R. 368, 24 
D.L.R. (3d) 484 (engineer’s control over building alterations). 
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J. on patents10 and Laskin C.J.C. on trade marks and names,11 and other 
judges produced the thoughtful occasional contribution.  Thus, 
Dickson J., although on unfamiliar territory, seemed to relish the 
intellectual challenge of getting to grips with the esoteric question of 
how comprehensible a patent specification had to be to pass muster as 
valid (less comprehensible to lay folk than the lower court had 
claimed, he finally decided for the Court).12 And the present Chief 
Justice, foreshadowing her tour de force for the Court in CCH13 a 
decade later, ventured forth extrajudicially on the general need for a 
balanced approach to intellectual property issues.14 
But the rest of the Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence 
before the early 1990s made mostly for pretty grim reading.  Even 
                                                           
10 Farbwerke Hoechst AG v. Commissioner of Patents (1966), 33 Fox P.C. 99, 50 
C.P.R. 220 (reissue);  S. & S. Industries Inc. v. Rowell, [1966] S.C.R. 419, 56 D.L.R. 
(2d) 501 (patent threats; Spence J. concurring); Formea Chemicals Ltd v. Polymer 
Corp. Ltd, [1968] S.C.R. 754, 69 D.L.R. (2d) 114 (Crown use); Armstrong Cork Canada 
v. Domco Industries Ltd, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 907, 156 D.L.R. (3d) 595 (non-exclusive 
patent licensee may claim infringement damages). 
11 La Maur Inc. v. Prodon Industries Ltd [1971] S.C.R. 973, 20 D.L.R.(3d) 10 
(confusion); Canadian Motorways Ltd v. Laidlaw Motorways Ltd [1974] S.C.R. 675, 40 
D.L.R.(3d) 52 (Laskin J. for majority (Pigeon J. concurring, Judson and Ritchie JJ. 
dissenting), upholding administrative decision requiring change of confusing 
corporate name); Chateau-Gai Wines Ltd v. Institut National des Appellations 
d’Origine des Vins et Eaux-de-Vie, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 190, 51 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (Laskin J. 
for 4:5 minority, arguing against protection of “champagne” under Canada- France 
trade treaty); MacDonald, supra note 4 (constitutionality of provisions in Trade-mark 
Act); Breck’s Sporting Goods Co. Ltd v. Magder, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 527, 63 D.L.R.(3d) 
645 [Breck’s] (assignment of manufacturer’s mark to exclusive distributor invalidated 
registration; parallel imports allowed). 
12 Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 504, 122 D.L.R. 
(3d) 203 [Consolboard].  See also:  General Motors Corp. v. Bellows, [1949] S.C.R. 678, 
10 C.P.R. 101, Rand J. (on trade-mark validity and infringement); Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1623, 60 D.L.R. (4th) 223, Lamer J. 
(disclosure requirement for genetically modified plant not fulfilled); R. v. Stewart, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 963, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 1, Lamer J. (copyright and confidential information 
not property under Criminal Code) [Stewart]; Shell Oil Co. v. Commissioner of 
Patents, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 536, 67 C.P.R. (2d) 1, Wilson J. (new use for old compound 
patentable). 
13 CCH, supra  note 1. 
14 B. McLachlin, “Intellectual Property – What's it all About?”, in G. Henderson ed., 
Trade Marks Law of Canada (Carswell, 1993); cf. Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 
467, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 97, McLachlin J. (affirming synchronization right in copyright and 
rejecting implied ephemeral recording exception for broadcasters). 
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Emmett Hall’s passion for health care seemed to desert him when he 
wrote for the Court on intellectual property cases involving 
medicines. Hall J. clearly realized the stakes when pharmaceutical 
companies tried to stop generic drug makers from replicating the 
shape and colour of pills that came off patent, or from formulating 
samples before applying for a licence or marketing authority prior to 
selling pills in quantity, or from enforcing overbroad claims on 
medicinal compounds.  Hall J. found, fairly enough, against the 
intellectual property holder and for the generic company in such 
cases. Yet his opinions were stilted and dry, little beyond an ex 
cathedra application of a prior English or Canadian precedent 
supporting his view, and the case then disposed of in a paragraph or 
two.  There was little, if any, reference to the case’s social or economic 
implications, or even to the competing arguments or case law.15 
These comments on the style of the Court’s intellectual 
property opinions may typify much of the Court’s writing generally in 
pre-Bill of Rights and pre-Charter days.  Nevertheless, a clear 
additional reason for the judges’ reticence is evident: their relative 
unfamiliarity with intellectual property law, which they readily 
admitted to, if asked.  Few seemed interested in making the effort 
required to familiarize themselves more. When they did dip their toe, 
one felt they really should have gone for full immersion.  Even the 
great could bellyflop when they stepped off well beaten paths of 
precedent into the slurry of intellectual property theory and minutiae. 
Take Compo Co. Ltd. v. Blue Crest Music Inc. decided in 
1979.16   Estey J. wrote for a unanimous Court on the question of 
                                                           
15 Parke, Davis & Co. v. Empire Laboratories Ltd, [1964] S.C.R. 351, 45 D.L.R. (2d) 97 
(trade-marks for pills); Hoechst Pharmaceuticals of Canada Ltd v. Gilbert & Co., 
[1966] S.C.R. 189, 32 Fox P.C. 56; and Société des usines chimiques Rhone-Poulenc v. 
Jules R. Gilbert Ltd (1968), 69 D.L.R.(3d) 353, 12 O.R. (2nd) 465 (overclaiming); Micro 
Chemicals Ltd v. Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corp., [1972] S.C.R. 506, 25 
D.L.R. (3d) 99 (research exemption for patents).  Similarly in non-medical cases: see 
Hall J’s opinions in Rodi & Wienenberger AG v. Metalliflex Ltd, [1966] S.C.R. 593 , 33 
Fox P.C. 87 (compulsory licensing); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., [1967] S.C.R. 664, 36 Fox P.C. 166 (obviousness); Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. 
v. Ford Motor Co., [1970] S.C.R. 833, 14 D.L.R. (4th) 210 (pre-existing use defence to 
patent infringement claim).  For a terse opinion for the Court in a passing-off case, see 
Tartan Breweries Ltd v. Carling Breweries (B.C.) Ltd (1969), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 773, 44 
Fox P.C. 6. 
16 [1980] 1 S.C.R. 357, 105 D.L.R. (3d) 249 [Campo].  
 10 
whether or not a company that pressed sound recordings needed 
copyright clearance from the copyright owner of the music, in 
addition to any clearance the record company that commissioned the 
presser may have needed. Estey J. examined the Copyright Act, found 
no relevant Canadian or British authorities on point, analyzed some 
comparable US authorities, and came to the plausible conclusion that 
the presser did indeed need clearance or it would be liable for 
infringement.  In the course of a lengthy judgment, Estey J. said, 
sensibly: 
“Courts in this technical field of copyright have found it 
prudent to make their judicial answers congruent with the 
legal issues raised in the proceeding at hand leaving, so far 
as possible, analogies, examples and hypothetical questions 
to another day.”17 
 
Unfortunately, he then proceeded to ignore his own advice, 
with repercussions for theoreticians and practitioners alike. Take two 
issues that have proved troublesome since: one narrow, the other 
broader. 
First, having correctly said that the record presser got no 
copyright in a record simply by pressing it, Estey J. then went on: 
 
“The fact that [the presser] did not and could not obtain 
copyright in the record is in no way determinative of the 
question, ‘Has [the presser] infringed the rights of the 
[copyright owner]?’ No unauthorized exercise of the 
owner’s mechanical rights in a work can produce in the 
wrongdoer a copyright in the resultant record.”18 
 
Now this last sentence is obiter because Estey J. had accepted 
that copyright in the record was owned by the record company.  The 
presser was just doing the donkey work the company had 
commissioned it to do, stamping out discs from the master recording.  
Yet the Estey dictum is sometimes taken in Canada as good law for 
the proposition that a work that infringes another’s copyright cannot 
                                                           
17 Ibid. at 372. 
18 Ibid. at 374-75. 
 11 
itself get copyright.  That may be US law because of a unique 
provision in the US Copyright Act that gives the copyright owner 
rights over derivative works such as records of copyright music, 
whether made with his consent or not.19  But it is not good law 
anywhere else in the Commonwealth outside Canada; nor should it be 
in Canada.20 
A moment’s thought demonstrates why. Suppose a translator 
spends months or years translating something in the reasonable belief 
that she has the copyright owner’s authority to do so. She turns out to 
be wrong—a surprisingly easy thing to do for either a professional or 
an amateur.21 Prima facie, the Copyright Act provides that she is, as 
author, the copyright owner of an original work. The Act also makes 
her an infringer of copyright in the source work, since the right to 
translate is part of copyright and honest intent does not excuse 
infringement.  There is no contradiction between being an author and 
infringing another’s rights.  The source owner can stop the translator 
from exploiting her translation.  The translator can stop everyone, 
including the source owner, from copying her work.  They can 
negotiate a deal if the source owner does want to stop her.  If he does 
not so want, why should third parties be able to copy her work for 
nothing?  All those propositions fit with the language and purpose of 
the Canadian Copyright Act,22 the treaties it implements, general 
principles of ownership, and our intuitive feelings of right, wrong, 
and proportion.  They certainly work better than a result that would, 
                                                           
19 17 U.S.C. s. 101; Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co. Inc., 290 F. 3d 548 
(3d Cir. 2002). 
20 See e.g. Ludlow Music Inc. v. Williams, [2002] F.S.R. 868 at 885-86 (Ch.); A-One 
Accessory Imports Pty Ltd v. Off Road Imports Pty Ltd (1996), 34 I.P.R. 306 (Aust. 
Fed.  Ct.).  See also D. Vaver, “Translation and Copyright: A Canadian Focus” (1994) 
16 E.I.P.R. 159; D. Vaver, “Abridgments and Abstracts: Copyright Implications” 
(1995) 17 E.I.P.R. 225. 
21 Although there is a copyright registry in Canada, registration is optional and few 
titles are registered; anyway, they are only presumptively, not conclusively, right.  
Finding title may require examining a long chain of documents, some in foreign 
languages, without knowing if there is a document missing.  Professionals such as 
CBC lawyers can get it wrong (Circle Films, supra  note 9), so what hope is there for 
amateurs? 
22 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 2 [Copyright Act] (“every original literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic work” includes “translations”), s. 13(1) (author is 
owner), s. 27(1) (infringement) & s. 34(1) (remedies), and s. 3(1)(a) (right to translate). 
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on Estey J.’s dictum, punitively deprive the translator of all benefit 
from her work. 
The second broader point Estey J. made causes even more 
difficulty.  It involves how intellectual property law relates to the 
general law.  Accepting an argument put by counsel, Estey J. said that: 
 
...[C]opyright law is neither tort law nor property law in 
classification, but is statutory law. It neither cuts across 
existing rights in property or conduct nor falls between 
rights and obligations heretofore existing in the common 
law. Copyright legislation simply creates rights and 
obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out 
in the statute. ... The legislation speaks for itself and the 
actions of the appellant must be measured according to the 
terms of the statute.23 
 
That statement is fine as far as it goes: owners and users 
should not have powers beyond what Parliament has conferred.  But 
what if the legislation does not “speak for itself”, as it often does not?  
Intellectual property laws are not passed in a vacuum.  They are only 
partial codes set against the backdrop of the general law. To suggest 
the solution to every intellectual property problem can be found 
within the four corners of the statute, without recourse to the baggage 
of general law the drafters expected readers would bring with them 
when looking at the statutes, is disingenuous. 
Take, for example, the proposition that copyright law is not 
“property law in classification”.  This may be a useful reminder not to 
apply the rules dealing with tangible property such as cars or 
chocolate bars mechanically to copyright or other intellectual 
property.  But suppose the question is whether a contract, will, or 
statute that refers to “property” includes a copyright. Can one just say 
“No, it does not, because copyright is not ‘property law in 
classification, but is statutory law’”?  I think not.  The way the 
Copyright Act contours the right gives it many of the characteristics 
of what we think of as property: rights to exclude third parties, the 
power to transfer and license, property-like remedies for 
                                                           
23 Compo, supra  note 16, 372-73. 
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infringement.24  So copyright or other intellectual property rights are 
capable of being characterized as property under a contract, will or 
statute.25 
The second question is more crucial: is this form of property 
meant to be caught by the language of this particular contract, will, or 
statute? The first question – is it capable of being so caught? – involves 
construing the intellectual property statute. The second – is it in fact 
so caught? – involves construing the particular contract, will, or 
statute that refers to property. It is perfectly possible to conclude that 
intellectual property is property within the meaning of one document, 
but not property within the meaning of another.  It might not be 
property that is capable of being stolen under the Criminal Code, as 
the Court convincingly demonstrated in 1988.26  It might very well be 
property under a will, where the testator disposes of his land to one 
set of beneficiaries and his personal property to another.27  It may or 
may not be property under a provincial statute that lets sheriffs seize 
personal property for non-payment of a judgment debt; provincial 
courts have reached different results in interpreting their execution 
statutes, depending on a close reading of the history and purpose of 
those Acts.28 
So perhaps before the 1990s the judges were wise to stick 
closely to what they had to decide and not venture into larger 
questions.  For when they did, they created problems for both 
                                                           
24 Other states make the point explicitly: e.g., in the U.K., subs. 1(1) of the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988 provides: “Copyright is a property right...”.  So do other 
UK intellectual property statutes: e.g., s. 30(1) of the Patents Act 1977: “Any patent or 
application for patent is personal property (without being a thing in action)...”   
The phrase in parentheses – “without being a thing in action” – is somewhat mystical: 
is there a tertium quid between a chose in possession and a chose in action?  The idea 
is presumably to oust the operation of the usual provisions on assigning things in 
action in s. 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (U.K.) – mirroring provincial 
provisions such as s. 36 of the Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253– in favour of 
the special assignment provisions of the Patents Act R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4. 
25 See e.g., Planet Earth Productions Inc. v. Rowlands (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 715, 73 
O.R. (2d) 505 (H.C.J.) [Planet Earth]. 
26 Stewart, supra note 12. 
27 Re Dickens, [1935] Ch. 267 (C.A.). 
28 Planet Earth, supra  note 25, holding copyright to be personal property under 
Ontario’s Execution Act; criticized in Vaver, “Can Intellectual Property be Taken to 
Satisfy a Judgment Debt?” (1991), 6 Banking & Finance L.Rev. 255. 
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themselves and lower courts.  The Estey dictum keeps cropping up in 
various guises in later Court decisions: for example, in such statements 
as that “the rights and remedies provided by the Copyright Act are 
exhaustive”.29 Such statements are potentially mischievous.   
For example, some intellectual property statutes—e.g., the 
Copyright Act—require assignments of the right to be in writing; 
otherwise they say the transaction is of no effect.  Some lower courts, 
relying on the Estey dictum, take those provisions quite literally.  No 
effect means no effect; an oral assignee or exclusive licensee is a legal 
non-entity: he gets no right at all.30  But suppose I pay $1m on a 
handshake for a copyright and spend another $1m developing and 
marketing it.  Is it really possible that the seller can pocket the $1m 
and say I have nothing at all—except a right to a refund, and maybe 
not even that—simply because we only shook hands and didn’t think 
to have the seller scribble down and sign the magic words: “I hereby 
assign you all my copyright in X”?   Have we not progressed beyond 
the “primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the 
sovereign, and every slip was fatal”?31  Commonwealth courts, 
including civilian jurisdictions such as Scotland, have long said that 
the intellectual property statutes deal only with legal rights and 
remedies; equity steps in where legal rules fail to go.32  An oral 
assignment for value does create rights: the assignee can go to court to 
get his title formalized by asking for an order compelling the seller to 
                                                           
29 See e.g., Canadian Assn of Internet Providers v. SOCAN, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 
S.C.R. 427 at para. 85, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 [Internet Providers].  
30 Jeffrey Rogers Knitwear Productions Ltd v. R.D. International Style Collections Ltd 
(1986), 19 C.P.R. (3d) 217 (Fed. T.D.) [Jeffrey Rogers]; Masterfile Corp. v. World 
Internett Corp. (2001), 16 C.P.R. (4th) 139 (Fed. T.D.) [Masterfile]. 
31 Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88 at 91 (C.A. 1917), Cardozo C.J., (on implying 
terms in contracts). 
32  Performing Right Society Ltd v. London Theatre of Varieties Ltd, [1924] A.C. 1 
(H.L.), the principle of which has been often applied in the Commonwealth outside 
Canada: see, e.g., Lakeview Computers plc v. Steadman, 1999 WL 1048310 (C.A.); 
Griggs Group Ltd v. Evans, [2004] F.S.R. 673 (Ch.), aff’d [2005] EWCA 11 [Griggs]; 
Comprop Ltd v. Moran, [2002] Jersey L.R. 222 at paras. 31-33 & 38 (Royal Ct.); 
Sheldon v. Metrokane, [2004] FCA 19 at paras. 47 & 55 (Aust. Fed. Ct.); Tayplan Ltd 
v. D & A Contracts, [2005] ScotCS CSOH 17, para. 7 (“If I assign a thing which is not 
mine, I assign all the rights I have to make it mine. ... The law implies that a cedent 
confers on his assignee everything which is necessary to make the assignation 
effectual”); cf. the inconclusive discussion in Downing v. General Synod of the 
Church of England in Canada, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 553, O.R. 652 (C.A.). 
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sign a transfer; in default, a court official can sign in the seller’s 
place.33  Even before then, oral assignees have got interlocutory 
injunctions against infringers, but no final injunction without first 
getting a signed assignment or joining the assignor.  Despite some 
favourable dicta in the Supreme Court,34 I do not know that any lower 
federal court has clearly recognized such equitable rights in an 
intellectual property case, and a number of decisions oppose the 
idea.35 I do not know if the argument for such rights was plainly put to 
the court.  What is clear is that Supreme Court statements to the 
effect that the language of the intellectual property statute is the 
beginning and end of rights and obligations under it wrongly dissuade 




How do the decisions before the 1990s compare with those of 
the last decade or so?  In this last period, the Supreme Court has made 
its mark on intellectual property law probably more firmly and 
extensively than in any other comparable period in its history.  The 
Court is plainly convinced of intellectual property’s importance to the 
economy. It has demonstrated its willingness to discuss the policy 
behind the intellectual property regimes and to reach decisions which 
further that policy as it sees it.  Few will complain of the brevity of 
the judgments.  Bottom-liners who cheered the judgments of the early 
1990s, which disposed of a case in three sentences (Iacobucci J. for the 
                                                           
33 Seanix Technology Inc. v. Ircha (1998), 78 C.P.R. (3d) 443 (B.C.S.C.); Csak v. 
Aumon (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 567 at 570 (Ont. H.C.J.); Peck v. Powell , [1885] 11 
S.C.R. 494. 
34 In Webb & Knapp, supra note 5, Abbott J. in his dissent (Ritchie J. concurring) 
recognized that an unwritten intention to transfer copyright constituted an equitable 
assignment; the majority (by Hall J.) did not disapprove, holding only that the parties 
lacked this intention.  The Supreme Court has elsewhere accepted that the beneficial 
owner of a right is its owner “in reality” even though, until a writing is signed, the 
right is formally held in the assignor’s name: Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 
S.C.R. 795 at para. 4. See also Bau- und Forschungsgesellschaft Thermoform AG v. 
Chang (1991), 60 B.C.L.R. (2d) 90, 37 C.P.R. (3d) 349 (C.A.), enforcing equitable 
interest in patent; Teledyne Industries Inc. v. Lido Industrial Products Ltd (1982), 68 
C.P.R. (2d) 204, 227 (Fed. T.D.), holding that the federal court may exercise all the 
powers of a court of equity. 
35 Jeffrey Rogers, supra note 30; Masterfile, supra note 30. 
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Court) or three pages (Cory J. for the Court),36 have nothing to cheer 
about in the lengthy prose that typifies the Court’s current forays into 
intellectual property. 
What questions has the Court considered?  There are of course 
issues that recur in one guise or another ever since intellectual 
property laws started being written centuries ago.  There are 
boundary disputes between rights: for example, can the same feature 
attract more than one intellectual property right—say a patent and a 
trade-mark—so that if one right expires or falls short, another can 
take its place?37  Pharmaceutical companies keep their never-ending 
war going with generic companies over their attempts to market 
arguably off-patent drugs.38  Collecting societies for music publishers 
and composers keep probing for new sources of revenue (now the 
internet) and have tried to enlist the Supreme Court’s help.39 
But new vistas have opened up.  The Court has faced 
important threshold questions: Can new genetic technologies be 
patented as inventions?  (Yes, if you’re patenting just the new gene; 
no, if you’re patenting the plant or animal containing the modified 
gene.  Unsurprisingly, both decisions were hotly disputed, with 
different narrow majorities swinging the case.40)  Who is an inventor 
and how much need he know when claiming more widely than his 
actual experiments?  (Answer: whoever thought up the inventive idea, 
                                                           
36 Boutin v. Distributions C.L.B. Inc., [1994] 2 S.C.R. 7 (Iacobucci J.); Apple Computer 
Inc. v. Mackintosh Computers Ltd, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 209, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 95 (Cory J.).  
See also Kyriacopoulos v. Bouchet (1966), 33 Fox Pat. C. 119 (S.C.C.). 
37 Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., 2005 SCC 65, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 259 D.L.R. 
(4th) 577 [Kirkbi]. 
38 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1998] 2 S.C.R. 129, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 1; Merck 
Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), [1998] 2 
S.C.R. 193, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 47; Bristol -Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney 
General), 2005 SCC 26, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 1; AstraZeneca Canada 
Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2006 SCC 49, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 272 D.L.R. (4th) 
577. 
39 Internet Providers, supra  note 29. 
40 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 
45, 219 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Harvard] (mouse unpatentable); Monsanto Inc. v. Schmeiser, 
2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 239 D.L.R. (4th) 271 [Monsanto] (plant gene 
patentable). 
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and she can then claim as far as sound prediction takes her.41)  How 
elaborate need a work be to qualify for copyright as original?  (Not 
very.  How about a catchline?42) Can an article, say a Lego block, be 
protected as a trade-mark once its patent and design rights have 
expired?  (No, once you’ve eaten your kilo of cake, it’s gone for 
ever.43) 
The Court has dealt with issues of responsibility for copyright 
infringements,44 and pre- and post-trial remedies for infringement 
generally and for the unauthorized taking and using of confidential 
information.45  It has taken up ownership issues: can arbitrators decide 
intellectual property ownership questions. (Yes, why not?46)  Do 
freelance journalists retain copyright over their work when their 
newspaper digitizes it? (Yes, for on-line transfer and archives; no, 
where the work is put on CD-ROM.47) 
The Court has decided equally important questions of scope: 
how widely could a patent be read to catch technology that didn’t 
quite correspond 1:1 with the words of the claims? (Answer: not too 
widely.48)  How far could trade-marks reach beyond the products on 
which they were actually used?  (Answer: Not as far as trade-mark 
owners would have liked.  Veuve Clicquot could not stop a women’s 
clothing store in Montreal calling itself Cliquot.  However bubbly the 
sales assistants, neither they, their products nor their store could be 
                                                           
41 Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, 219 
D.L.R. (4th) 660. 
42 CCH, supra note 1. 
43 Kirkbi, supra note 37. 
44 CCH, supra note 1; Internet Providers, supra note 29. 
45 Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v FBI Foods Ltd., [1999] 1 S.C.R. 142, 167 D.L.R. (4th) 577 
(compensation); Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition Corp., 2006 SCC 36, 
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 189, 269 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (requirements for Anton Piller orders); 
Monsanto, supra note 40 (account). 
46 Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) Inc., 2003 SCC 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 178, 223 
D.L.R. (4th) 407. 
47 Robertson v. Thompson Corp., 2006 SCC 43, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 363, 274 D.L.R. (4th) 
138, a 4:5 dissent that would have let the newspapers have rights over all digitized 
content. 
48 Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., 2000 SCC 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 194 
D.L.R. (4th) 232; Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., 2000 SCC 67, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 
194 D.L.R. (4th) 193. 
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confused with the products or business of the French champagne 
house, nor could they affect its image.49  Mattel also couldn’t force a 
bar-and-grill chain to stop calling itself “Barbie’s”; Barbie dolls’ fame 
didn’t quite reach as far as barbecue pits.50) 
Perhaps most interestingly, the Court emphatically rejected 
the idea long peddled by intellectual property holders worldwide that 
their rights should be construed expansively, while users are left with 
nothing but a prayer and a few grudging statutory exceptions.  In a 
copyright case involving photocopy access to the resources of the Law 
Society of Upper Canada’s Great Library, the Court made it clear that 
users had rights too, rights that should get the same sort of benevolent 
interpretation as was extended to the rights granted to right holders.51  
What the Court said was true for copyright must be equally true for 
other intellectual property rights.52 
Binnie J. has led the Court in many of the decisions, but other 
judges have also taken star turns or cameo roles.  Intellectual property 
cases are no longer the hot potato that is passed round and round until 
it is finally picked up by some reluctant player to whom the Chief 
Justice has helpfully supplied heat-resistant mitts. 
 
III 
The Supreme Court’s most recent foray into intellectual 
property has been its decision on July 26, 2007 in Euro-Excellence 
Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc.53  The scenario was this: a manufacturer 
wants to distribute its products worldwide only through distributors 
                                                           
49 Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltée, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 
824, 270 D.L.R. (4th) 1. 
50 Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772, 268 D.L.R. 
(4th) 424.  Perhaps, in hindsight, Barbie’s image might have been better protected if 
more money had been spent on ensuring that she wasn’t actually hazardous to the 
health of her loyal following, rather than on Mattel’s worrying about fancied hazards 
to her image from non-competing eateries. 
51 CCH, supra note 1. 
52 So argued for patents in D. Vaver & S. Basheer, “Popping Patented Pills: Europe and 
a Decade’s Dose of TRIPs” [2006] 28 E.I.P.R. 282. 
53 2007 SCC 37, [2007] 282 D.L.R. (4th) 353 [Kraft].  Coincidentally, the case had 
particular contemporary interest at the time this lecture was given, in the light of the 
excitement around the strong Canadian dollar and the varied effect it was then having 
on availability and prices relative to the United States.   
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he authorizes.  Unauthorized distributors are to be excluded. The 
problem is that the product is a perfectly ordinary consumable: here, 
branded chocolate.  The manufacturer, actually two European 
affiliates of the giant US food producer Kraft Foods Inc., wanted to 
stop parallel imports of Toblerone and another brand of chocolate 
from Europe into Canada.  The imports were genuine and carried 
their original packaging and trade-marks, so trade-mark or passing-off 
law could not prop up Kraft’s scheme: no consumer was fooled into 
buying something different from what he expected.54 The Canadian 
importer was committing no tort or breach of contract. The 
chocolates were unpatented.  So Kraft turned to copyright. 
It did not claim, as it might successfully have done in Canada 
in the early 1980s, that the chocolates themselves were protected by 
copyright.55  Instead, Kraft Europe claimed copyright in the logos – 
the trade-marks with their design features – that appeared on the 
chocolate wrappers.  It gave its Canadian counterpart, Kraft Canada, 
an exclusive licence in the copyright in Canada for a nominal annual 
sum, and then joined in the copyright infringement suit that its 
subsidiary brought against the importer. 
This was no original scheme.  Pigeon J. had flagged a similar 
possibility in 1974.56  A decade later, the makers of Bailey’s Irish 
                                                           
54 Smith & Nephew Inc. v. Glen Oak Inc. (1996), 68 C.P.R. (3d) 153 (Fed. C.A.) (no 
trade-mark infringement); Consumer’s Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd, 
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 583, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (no passing-off).  Assigning or licensing the 
Canadian trade-mark rights risked invalidating the marks as non-distinctive because 
consumers might not know whether the Europeans or the Canadians stood behind 
the product: Breck’s, supra note 11. 
55 In those heady days, ordinary products were sometimes protected by saying that 
copying them was a breach of artistic copyright and to copy the product was 
indirectly to copy the artistic manufacturing drawings that revealed the product 
shape, whether or not the second comer had ever seen the drawings. See Spiro-Flex 
Industries Ltd v. Progressive Sealing Inc. (1986), 7 B.C.L.R. (2d) 189, 32 D.L.R. (4th) 
201 (S.C.) (copyright in drawings for pump prevented others from copying the pump).  
Parliament closed off this strategy by an amendment (now s. 64) to the Copyright Act 
in 1988: see D. Vaver, “The Canadian Copyright Amendments of 1988” (1988) 4 I.P.J. 
121. 
56 Trudel v. Clairol Inc. of Canada [1975] 2. S.C.R. 236, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 399 [Trudel]. 
“Can a manufacturer make use of copyright on the directions for use of his product so 
as to subject its sale to all the rights provided in the Copyright Act...?” Answer in 
Australia, pre-1998: yes (Pioneer Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v. Lee, [2000] FCA 
1926 (Aust. Fed. Ct.) (DVD players). 
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Cream used copyright in labels to stop parallel imports into Australia, 
and TDK then successfully tried the same ploy in South Africa with 
parallel imports of its audio tapes.57  The scheme did not always work.   
It failed in the European Union, where Dior relied on both trade-
mark law and copyright in its logo to try to prevent a discount drug 
store from advertising and selling Dior products. The European Court 
of Justice said trade-mark law could not stop somebody from honestly 
advertising genuine goods; and copyright law should not go where 
trade-mark law feared to tread.58  The Australians changed their 
statute in 1998 to stop what they saw as an abuse of copyright law.59 
Canadian policy makers have thus long been aware of the problem, 
but have chosen to neglect it. 
An ingenuous observer might of course ask two pertinent 
questions of the Canadian case.  First, had not Kraft already profited 
from its sale to the European source from which the Canadian 
importer had bought?  What business had it then in impairing a 
resale? Some states recognize that logic by saying a first sale exhausts 
whatever copyrights a work had till then.  The intellectual property 
owner loses all downstream control over resales.  As we shall see, 
Canada recognizes that rule only weakly: just where the copyright 
owner is identical in both the exporting and importing country. 
The ingenuous observer might then ask her second question: 
was not the Kraft group really behind the whole case? Why should we 
pretend that the puppetry between the Kraft subsidiaries with the 
licence agreement made any difference? The short answer is: where 
would corporate law or corporate lawyers be if paper arrangements 
among parents and subsidiaries were not given legal effect?  We have 
long become enured to Holmes J.’s bon mot that “The life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience.”  He might have said with 
                                                           
57 R. & A. Bailey Co. v. Boccaccio Pty Ltd (1986), 84 F.L.R. 232 (Aust. Fed. Ct.); Frank 
& Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v. A. Roopanand Brothers (Pty) Ltd (1993), 29 I.P.R. 465 (App. 
Div. S.A.). 
58 Parfums Christian Dior SA v Evora BV, [1997] E.C.R. I-6013 at para. 58: “the 
protection conferred by copyright as regards the reproduction of protected works in a 
reseller's advertising may not, in any event, be broader than that which is conferred 
on a trade mark owner in the same circumstances”. 
59 Copyright Act 1968, s. 10(1), as am. 1998, c. C-42 referred to in Kraft, supra note 53 
at para. 5, Rothstein J. 
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equal truth: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
fiction.” 
The lower courts followed this revised dictum to find that 
Kraft Canada, a different copyright holder from Kraft Europe, could 
enforce its right to stop parallel imports.  The federal court of appeal 
affirmed a judgment awarding Kraft a large sum of damages and an 
injunction to have the importer blank out the trade-marks when 
selling chocolates.60  By a 7-2 majority, the Supreme Court reversed 
this judgment – but what an odd majority, and what an odd reversal.  
Had the Court sat two years earlier with its then different 
composition of judges, or as a panel of five or seven, the result could 
easily have been different.  Which recalls Milton’s lines from Paradise 
Lost: 
 
“...Chaos Umpire sits,  
And by decision more imbroiles the fray 
By which he Reigns: next him high Arbiter 
Chance governs all...”61 
 
Or, less stirringly, Tom Brown’s satirical rhyme about Dean 
John Fell of Christ Church, Oxford, in the 17th century: 
 
I do not love thee, Doctor Fell, 
The reason why I cannot tell; 
But this alone I know full well, 
I do not love thee, Doctor Fell. 
 
A clear majority of the Court seemed unhappy with the lower 
courts’ result, but could not agree on the source of their unhappiness.  
The only common point of agreement was that a parallel importer 
need not fear an infringement suit based on copyright in trade-marks 
or product packaging, where the entity which owns the copyright in 
both Canada and the country of export is the same. Beyond that, 
matters disintegrate. 
                                                           
60 Kraft Canada Inc.v. Euro-Excellence Inc., [2004] 4 F.C.R. 410, mod. & aff’d [2006] 3 
F.C.R. 91 (C.A.). 
61 Book 2, ll. 907-10. 
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The precise question before the court involved an oddly 
drafted provision on importing, subsection 27(2) of the Copyright Act, 
the antecedents of which can be traced back to the copyright laws of 
Victorian Britain.  The subsection provides that importing for sale or 
distribution is infringement if the importer knew or should have 
known the work would infringe copyright “if it had been made in 
Canada by the person who made it”.62   Philosophers might well ask 
how one can have actual, let alone constructive knowledge, of a 
hypothetical set of facts.  This point is rather serious since a form of 
subsection 27(2), omitting constructive knowledge, appears in the 
criminal enforcement provisions of the Act: deliberate parallel 
importing seems to be a crime as well as a civil wrong, and attracts on 
indictment a maximum million dollar fine and 5 years’ jail.63 
The question which divided the Supreme Court was this: 
could Kraft Canada (the licensee) hypothetically have sued Kraft 
Europe (the person who had the logo made) for infringement of the 
Canadian copyright?  If so, the importer infringed Canadian 
copyright, because Kraft Europe hypothetically infringed. 
If one sets aside whether or not this convoluted means of 
imposing civil liability is good policy, the issue is whether or not the 
statutory hypothesis can be made to work satisfactorily.  It seems best 
geared to a case where the Canadian and foreign company are at 
arms’-length, so that the permissible partitioning of territory by 
copyright is the result of an arms’-length deal.  The foreign company’s 
profits from its foreign copyrights would then be its alone; the profits 
the Canadian company makes or expects would also be its own and 
would come from exploiting the Canadian copyrights it bought.  
But in Kraft the two companies were not at arms’-length.  
They were controlled by the parent, Kraft US.  Must this fact be 
ignored?  I suggest not.  On the hypothesis the Copyright Act 
requires, Kraft Europe would never have infringed Kraft Canada’s 
copyright had Kraft Europe produced trade-marked chocolate 
wrappings in Canada, for this act would have been ultimately 
authorized by the companies’ US parent.  Kraft US would never have 
allowed Kraft Canada to sue Kraft Europe to the group’s ultimate 
                                                           
62 Importing for private consumption is not caught; cross-border shoppers may shop 
with clear conscience. 
63 Copyright Act, s.42(1)(g), supra note 22. 
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detriment. If the theoretical distinction between the commission of a 
wrong and the decision whether or not to sue for it must be 
maintained, then one may say that Kraft Canada would inevitably 
have consented to Kraft Europe’s activities.  Consent precludes 
infringement; the claimant who does not plead and prove his lack of 
consent to the defendant’s act omits an essential element of copyright 
infringement and should have his case dismissed.64  Thus, no 
infringement of Kraft Canada’s rights could have occurred, whether 
Kraft Canada was Kraft Europe’s assignee or exclusive licensee. 
This reasoning accepts the artificial reality of the two 
companies as separate entities, but realistically treats them as 
members of the same family who would never serve the Queen’s writ 
upon the other.  The argument does not require a fictitious intent to 
be implied; it infers an intent that must have existed in reality.  For 
what is tortious between arms’-length corporations need not be so 
between affiliates.  This reasoning also preserves the value of 
Canadian copyrights as assets that may be genuinely dealt with 
between arms’-length parties.65 
Had the Court adopted this line of reasoning, the Kraft 
plaintiffs would have lost their case on grounds that were both 
commercially satisfying and also juridically respectable.  None of the 
nine judges, however, considered this argument.  Perhaps the point 
was not made this way to them.  Perhaps they may have wanted 
evidence of Kraft’s corporate set-up, although judicial notice might 
easily have been taken of it.  Instead, the Court divided into four 
blocs, with mixed concurrences and dissents: 
1.  In what are labelled the Court’s “Reasons for Judgment”, 
three judges led by Rothstein J. said that Kraft Canada could not sue 
Kraft Europe: an exclusive licensee can sue everyone for infringement, 
except the copyright owner.  No owner can be sued for infringing his 
own copyright.  Had Kraft Europe transferred copyright ownership to 
Kraft Canada, the importer would have lost. 
2. Three judges led by Bastarache J. said Rothstein J. was 
wrong: the exclusive licensee had by statute an interest in copyright, 
                                                           
64 Avel Pty Ltd v. Multicoin Amusements Pty Ltd (1990),171 C.L.R. 88 (Aust. H.C.); 
R. v. Laurier Office Mart Inc. (1994), 58 C.P.R. (3d) 403 (Ont. Prov. Div.), aff’d (1995), 
63 C.P.R. (3d) 229 (Ont. Gen. Div.). 
65 A concern of Rothstein J’s in Kraft, supra note 53 at para. 21. 
 24 
which meant he could sue the copyright owner.  But, said Bastarache 
J., he could sue him only for importing to sell the work, not to sell 
something like a trade-mark or packaging that is just incidental to the 
work.  To paraphrase: if you sell a cat, unless it’s a Manx, the tail 
comes with it; you don’t say you’re selling a cat and a tail. 
3. Two judges, Abella J. with McLachlin C.J.C. concurring, 
said Bastarache J. was right about the exclusive licence but wrong on 
his cat-and-tail argument.  They agreed on this point with Rothstein 
J., who also rejected Bastarache J.’s tail-with-cat argument: when do 
you know a tail is incidental to the cat?  Some cats might fall over 
without it, or would be laughed out of a cat show. 
4. Just to thicken this bouillabaisse, Fish J. concurred in 
Rothstein J.’s reasons for judgment but added his “grave doubt 
whether the law governing the protecting of intellectual property 
rights in Canada can be transformed in this way into an instrument of 
trade control not contemplated by the Copyright Act.”66 
So we find different majorities for and against different 
propositions.  If we assume the importer has the requisite actual or 
constructive knowledge, parallel imports are allowed or not in the 
following cases: 
(a) If there is copyright in the product (say a sound recording) 
and an assignment of the Canadian copyright, parallel import for 
resale or rental is not allowed. (The whole Court would agree with 
that, possibly even Fish J.) 
(b) Importing is also not allowed if there is a grant of an 
exclusive Canadian licence in the copyright.  (At least five of the nine 
judges would agree with this: the Bastarache and Abella blocs.) 
(c) If the copyright is in the trade-mark or packaging and 
there is an assignment of Canadian copyright, then the product cannot 
be imported without prior deletion of the copyright material. (A 
majority of five would agree with this: the Rothstein and Abella blocs.  
Fish J. might not join them.) 
(d) The product can be imported in that case if there is just a 
grant of a Canadian exclusive licence, but we do not know 
conclusively why.  Four of the judges say: because the exclusive 
licence makes all the difference.  Three say: because the trade-mark or 
                                                           
66 Ibid. at para. 56. 
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packaging is just incidental.  And each group vehemently dissents 
with the other’s view. 
  
IV 
What does Kraft suggest about intellectual property today?  
And why should anyone other than intellectual property lawyers and 
policy-makers care? 
First, whoever is interested in the Rule of Law should care: if 
the statutory provisions at issue in Kraft are typical – and I fear they 
are – then our intellectual property laws are not well drafted and need 
to be urgently improved.  If our top judges cannot agree on them, 
what hope is there for legal advisers or ordinary users of the system? 
Secondly, whoever is interested in competition and consumer 
law should care: for Kraft suggests that copyright protects too much 
too easily.  The law can be easily manipulated to stifle competition.  
Copyright has moved away from its core function of protecting 
cultural products into the realm of ordinary industry and commerce. 
The logo might technically qualify as an original art, although bits 
were excluded as unoriginal by the trial judge following the Supreme 
Court’s tightening up of originality criteria in the Osgoode Great 
Library case.67  We might accept that copyright usefully protects the 
original artist’s interest in initially being able to market her work, 
although in practice she usually loses all rights in it by contract to the 
firm that employed her as employee or consultant.68  But once the 
logo is used as a trade-mark and the artist has no further legal interest 
in it, the laws relating to commerce (trade-mark law), not culture, 
should govern its protection, and copyright should drop out of the 
picture. 
Thirdly, economists and international trade lawyers should 
care: for, as Kraft indicates, copyright law in fact is less about 
protecting culture than about protecting businesses from competition.  
                                                           
67 Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro Excellence Inc. 2004 FC 652, [2004] F.C.R. 410 at paras. 
31-37 (Fed. Ct.), following CCH, supra note 1.  The findings on originality were 
unchallenged on appeal. 
68 Griggs, supra note 32, where, even with no express term on copyright ownership, 
the company making “Doc Martens” shoes was held to be the equitable owner of 
copyright in the trade-mark design it had commissioned from an advertising agency, 
which in turn had used a freelance designer to author the work. 
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Most of intellectual property law is designed to achieve that end.  The 
protection is to encourage invention and cultural production, but we 
never know how much protection is necessary or desirable.  In 
principle, we should not protect more than is necessary to produce 
the conduct we want.  Any more just imposes social costs and diverts 
resources away from other sectors of the economy. 
In that light, the question of how far copyright should ban 
parallel importing should be revisited.  We have free trade agreements 
galore; yet when intellectual property is involved, we suddenly find 
that copyright acts as a restriction on competition and goods cannot 
cross borders freely at all.  What intellectual property laws cannot 
achieve is now often achieved technologically: so-called technological 
protection and digital management measures are used to impose 
restrictions on who can use what and where.69  These points need 
revisiting not just for copyright-protected products, but for 
intellectual property products generally. 
Movement might no doubt be restricted in particular sectors 
for good reason.  Book distributors played the Canadian culture card 
to get protection in 1997 under the copyright law amendments for 
their local distribution systems.  Hair dye makers defended, on safety 
grounds, a dual distribution system that allowed sales of unlabelled 
products only to professionals and of labelled products only to 
consumers.70  But what may go for books or hazardous goods hardly 
goes for European chocolate bars or other ordinary consumer 
products.  In the European Union and European Free Trade Area, the 
idea of a common market has meant that intellectual property laws 
cannot prevent goods from moving around freely within Europe, 
although imports from outside Europe can be stopped.  As one text 
puts it: 
...[P]arallel (or gray) importation, i.e., buying in a low-cost 
country and selling in a high-cost country, is likely to occur 
(and indeed in many ways is encouraged) and that practice 
may act, within the Community itself, as an adjustment 
mechanism driving towards price uniformity.  The activities 
                                                           
69 D. Vaver, “Copyright and the internet: from owner rights and user duties to user 
rights and owner duties?” (2007) 57:3 Case Western L.Rev. 000 (in press).  
70 Trudel, supra note 56, decided on Quebec civil law, expressly without reference to 
competition law principles. 
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of the parallel importer are thus of singular importance to 
achievement of the Single Market and have been supported, 
wherever possible, by Community institutions – not least by 
the Court of Justice.71   
 
European negotiators use free entry into European markets as 
a bargaining chip when negotiating bilateral trade agreements.  What 
has always been extraordinary about the NAFTA as a free trade 
agreement is its silence on the question of free movement of 
intellectual property-protected goods within the NAFTA area, or their 
entry from outside the area while their intellectual property is 
ultimately controlled by a NAFTA-based entity such as Kraft Foods 
Inc. 
Fourthly, economists may also care about the question 
whether multiple intellectual property rights in any work are 
desirable or not.  Intellectual property legislation sometimes deals 
with overlaps, but only erratically.  In principle, multiple rights seem 
unnecessary.  If intellectual property rights are a carrot to encourage 
conduct, when do we need to dangle two carrots to encourage a single 
activity?  Would we have fewer or worse trade-marks if they lacked 
copyright protection?  I doubt it.  The need for effective marketing is 
spur enough to create effective trade-marks. 
Of course, every producer or right holder would like double 
protection.  Many pilots prefer twin-engine to single-engine craft, just 
as firms and their advisers like back-up just in case one form of 
protection fails.  But that reasoning hardly applies here.  Trade-marks 
retain common law protection even after they get registered under 
the Trade-marks Act; to confer copyright on them as well is to protect 
thrice over.  Only legal neurotics or carrot gluttons need that. 
Lastly, free speech lawyers should care: for although copyright 
is often touted as a means to protect and encourage free speech,72 it 
often works to restrict speech, and particularly so where copyright in 
trade-marks is recognized.  Buying chocolate bars seems distant from 
                                                           
71 W. Cornish and D. Llewelyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade 
Marks and Allied Rights, 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 737. 
72 N. Netanel, “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society” (1996) 106 Yale L.J. 283; Y. 
Benkler, “Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure 
of the Public Domain” (1999) 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354. 
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free speech issues, but consider this instance from a decade ago: the 
Michelin tyre company successfully sued a trade union that had used 
a caricature of its registered mark of a roly-poly cartoon figure in 
leaflets designed to persuade workers in Michelin’s Nova Scotia plants 
to join the union.  The case failed in passing-off and trade-mark 
infringement because the court decided that the union was not using 
the mark in trade on any goods or for any services.  But the union was 
found liable for infringing copyright in the trade-mark.  There was no 
defence under the Copyright Act—parody is not a specific head of fair 
dealing in Canada73—nor did the Charter claim of freedom of 
expression succeed: in a struggle between that right and copyright as 
“property” (Estey J. notwithstanding74), copyright triumphed.75  
I do not know if that first instance decision can stand in the 
light of later Supreme Court jurisprudence. In a comparable later case 
in South Africa, the Constitutional Court preferred free speech over 
trade-mark rights where a critic of a brewery company’s hiring 
practices put the brewer’s trade-mark on a T-shirt with some critical 
comment.76 One hopes that current Canadian courts would be no less 
protective of free speech.77  But so far lower courts continue to tread 
                                                           
73 Copyright Act ss. 27(1)(a) & (a.1), supra note 22.  The Michelin court (Compagnie 
Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, 
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW- Canada), 
[1997] 2 F.C. 306, 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348 (T.D.) [Michelin] rejected the view that parody 
was impliedly “criticism”, a statutory head of fair dealing; sed quaere. 
74 See text above accompanying notes 23 ff. 
75 Michelin, supra note 73. 
76 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International (Finance) BV, 
2006 (1) S.A. 144 (Sth Afr. Const. Ct.); see generally, J. Griffiths & U. Suthersanen, 
eds., Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
77 See e.g., R. v. Guignard, 2002 SCC 14, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 472, where LeBel J. for the 
Court invalidated, on Charter free expression grounds, a municipal bylaw that 
outlawed the erection or display of signs which included any trade name, if the 
municipality had not first approved them. An aggrieved customer of an insurance 
company was thus free to maintain a sign on his property that “named and shamed” 
the company for allegedly delaying payment of a claim.  LeBel J. said municipalities 
could not take away citizens’ rights to air grievances cheaply and effectively, adding 
that “simple means of expression such as posting signs or distributing pamphlets or 
leaflets or, these days, posting messages on the Internet are the optimum means of 
communication for discontented consumers” (ibid., para. 25). See also Musical 
Fidelity Ltd v. Vickers, [2003] F.S.R. 898, 907 (C.A.), where it was suggested that 
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the Michelin line.  Around the same time as Kraft was being decided, 
a Quebec court banned, on copyright grounds, a trade union from 
reproducing on its placards the masthead of the newspaper against 
which the workers were striking.  Again, the court swept aside the 
union’s Charter arguments: strikers had no greater privilege than any 
other citizen to use others’ “property.”78 
 
V 
What characterizes the Supreme Court’s recent decisions as a 
whole? 
First, the judges are more informed about and interested in 
intellectual property issues than ever before.  They often resort to a 
metaphor of balance: weighing the need to give an intellectual 
property holder fair protection as an incentive to create or acquire the 
intellectual property in the first place, against the needs of 
competitors and the public to have fair access to ideas and products. 
Secondly, prior to the 1990s, intellectual property decisions 
rarely created much dissent.  The single concurred-in judgment was 
the norm.79  Today, the Court seems more divided in intellectual 
property cases.  Dissents and concurrences are quite common. Perhaps 
this is true of other cases too.  In intellectual property law, the reason 
is sometimes the inherently controversial nature of the dispute, 
coupled with opaque law.  For example, the patenting of higher life 
                                                                                                                                  
freedom of expression under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
(art.10) might allow the posting on a website of a copyright-protected letter to 
criticize its contents and sender. 
78 Corporation Sun Media c. Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique, 2007 QCCS 
2943, para. 32: “Le tribunal ne peut se convaincre que le seul fait d’être en conflit de 
travail permet à un tiers d’utiliser la propriété d’un autre et ce n’est pas brimer la 
liberté d’expression, mais c’est une juste limite à cette liberté d’expression.” [“The 
court is unconvinced that the mere fact of a labour conflict allows a third party to use 
another’s property.  This does not infringe freedom of expression, but is a just limit on 
such freedom.” (My translation - DV)] 
79 There are of course exceptions: see e.g., the disagreement, giving rise to three 
opinions, about whether “Gold Band” and “Golden Circlet” were confusing marks for 
tobacco products: Benson & Hedges (Can.) Ltd v. St Regis Tobacco Corp., [1969] 
S.C.R. 192, 1 D.L.R. (3d) 462 (Ritchie J. for the majority affirming the reversal of the 
Trade Marks Office’s view that they were not; Pigeon J. concurring; Cartwright C.J.C. 
dissenting).  
 30 
forms is inherently controversial; add the need to interpret a 
provision defining an invention in language dating back to an early 
19th century American law, and dissent is not unlikely.80  Sometimes 
the common and civil lawyers on the court fall out over doctrinal 
differences.81  Sometimes the metaphor of balance produces different 
emphases and different conclusions: it is easy to calibrate weights and 
scales differently. 
Thirdly, the court’s methodology today has moved on from 
that of a couple of decades ago.  The judges all clearly recognize the 
international nature of intellectual property and are receptive to 
comparative and policy arguments.  They of course pay close attention 
to the language of the legislation, but are willing to interpret it in the 
light of experience abroad. 
Yet sometimes, with the best will in the world, the 
interpretation problems are intractable.  The legislation is just not 
clear enough. We saw it in the arguments in the Harvard Mouse case82 
about whether or not a genetically modified animal is an invention. 
The Kraft case is the most recent striking example of the lack of 
clarity of legislation, the drafting of which traces back into the 19th 
century.  Both Rothstein and Bastarache JJ. claimed to interpret the 
statute purposively but each saw different purposes in it and each 
claimed the other was reading in words that were not in the Act.  
In one of his papers, Learned Hand offered some useful advice 
on statutory interpretation, advice partly born of his experience in 
writing many excellent intellectual property judgments over his life as 
a judge of the US district court and later the US court of appeals for 
the Second Circuit: 
 
The judge must ... find out the will of the government from 
words which are chosen from common speech and which 
had better not attempt to provide for every possible 
contingency. How does he in fact proceed? Although at 
times he says and believes that he is not doing so, what he 
                                                           
80 See Harvard supra note 40; Monsanto, supra note 40. 
81 E.g., Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 336, where the court divided in interpreting the term “reproduction” in the 
Copyright Act largely on those grounds. 
82 Harvard, supra note 40. 
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really does is to take the language before him ... and try to 
find out what the government ... would have done, if the 
case before him had been before them.  He calls this finding 
the intent of the statute. ... This is often not really true. The 
men who used the language did not have any intent at all 
about the case that has come up; it had not occurred to their 
minds. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to know what they 
would have said about it, if it had. ... 
The judge must always remember that he should go no 
further than he is sure the government would have gone, 
had it been faced with the case before him. If he is in doubt, 
he must stop, for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests 
in the society for which he speaks would have come to a 
just result, even though he is sure that he knows what the 
just result would be. He is not to substitute his juster will 
for theirs; otherwise it would not be the common will 
which prevails, and to that extent the people would not 
govern. 83 
 
The problem with intellectual property laws, as Kraft 
recognizes, is that one cannot be sure from the language where the 
government is coming from, let alone where it is going.  Judges grope 
for what signs they can find to discern on an undedicated path.  This 
is no longer good enough, if it ever was.  How many cases like Kraft 
have to occur for the government to recognize that it needs to 
modernize the whole intellectual property law and produce a system 
that actually makes things simpler for creators and innovators, and the 
firms that employ and bankroll them and distribute their products?  
I have long argued that Canada needs to modernize its 
intellectual property laws.84  The field is particularly untidy.  The 
great codifications of the 19th century in the law of sale of goods, bills 
of exchange and crime were successful in systemizing and clarifying 
the law, as well as exposing shortfalls and setting the scene for 
periodic reform.  Codification of all intellectual property rights into a 
                                                           
83 “How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?” in I. Dillard, ed., The Spirit of 
Liberty: Papers and Addresses of Learned Hand  3d ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1974) at 106, 109. 
84 See e.g., D. Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks 
(Concord, Ont.: Irwin Law, 1997) at ch. 6, passim; D. Vaver, “Recreating a Fair 
Intellectual Property System for the 21st Century” (2001) 15 I.P.J. 123. 
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single unified code would have the same effect.  It would remove 
fragmentation, deal comprehensively with common issues, more 
precisely delineate boundaries between rights, minimize discrepancies 
and overlaps, and generally reduce transaction costs.  
The provisions on transfer and licensing of intellectual 
property rights, as well as defences to and remedies for infringement, 
could be standardized.  Now there are wide differences for no reason 
other than the provisions were drafted at different times by different 
hands. In Kraft, some of the judges seemed to think there is hardly 
any difference between an assignment and an exclusive licence. If that 
is true (and I am with Rothstein J. in thinking that it is not so in 
Canada),85 then we should make that explicit. 
We need a single national registry of intellectual property 
rights to be established, allowing electronic filing and cross-searching.  
This could serve as a model that would develop into a regional and 
worldwide network of registries and would facilitate transparent 
ownership and transfer. 
There will, of course, be difficulties. Change in intellectual 
property law is always a fractious affair.  In the early 1950s Canada 
reformed its trade-mark law by appointing a committee headed by Dr. 
Harold Fox Q.C. to draft a new law.86  The committee did that; the 
law was quickly enacted; and most acknowledge that it has done 
serviceable duty for a half-century.  Even so, that law needs updating 
given advances in technology and theoretical understanding since; but 
at least the statute is internally coherent, being based on a coherent 
vision.  Is there not a good case for a committee like that to undertake 
reform and modernization of the whole intellectual property system 
today? 
Not only do we need clearer and fairer laws; we need simpler 
laws that are easier to read and understand.  Successive governments 
have not really been serious about keeping intellectual property law 
under continuing review in this or other respects.  They have gone 
through the motions but the net result is that treaties are duly 
implemented and a Copyright Board has been established, but little 
                                                           
85 E.g., D. Vaver, “The Exclusive Licence in Copyright” (1995), 9 I.P.J. 163, passim. 
86 Report of the Trade Mark Law Revision Committee (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
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else of substance has occurred.  This failure of legislative policy and 
national vision costs the economy dearly.  
Consider what Dickson J. said a quarter century ago about the 
provision in the Patent Act which requires the inventor properly to 
disclose his invention.  This section (then s. 36), he said, was “at the 
heart of the patent system”.  Here is how it looked to him on a legal 
cardiogram: 
 
It cannot be said that s. 36 of the Act is happily phrased. It 
gives the impression of a mélange of ideas gathered at 
random rather than an attempt to enunciate, clearly and 
concisely, a governing principle or principles. This is 
perhaps understandable in that the section is the product of 
amendment over a period of many years. The language 
simply does not lend itself to a tight, literal interpretation. 
It is, and should be treated as, a parliamentary 
pronouncement, in general terms....87 
 
And he then proceeded to trace the history of the language 
that appeared in s. 36 from Canada’s 1869 patent law derived from an 
1836 US statute. The US provision has since been changed, but the 
only reform the Canadian provision has undergone is that it has been 
renumbered.88   
Other criticisms of the drafting of the intellectual property 
statutes litter the books.  Dickson C.J.C.’s remarks typify how much of 
Canada’s intellectual property law looks today. These laws were often 
badly written when they were first enacted; successive amendments 
have been better, but not much.  The laws have never been drafted – 
as they should be – so as to be understood by the users of the system: 
authors, inventors, designers, entrepreneurs, and their backers. Like 
old cars, the statutes have had bits tacked on here and papered over 
there. But these are not vintage cars worth hanging on to.  At some 
stage they need to be traded in or junked.  I think that time is fast 
approaching, if it is not already here. 
 
                                                           
87 Consolboard, supra note 12 at 23. 
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